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Abstract—This letter mainly studies the transmit antenna selec-
tion(TAS) based on deep learning (DL) scheme in untrusted relay
networks. In previous work, we discover that machine learning
(ML)-based antenna selection schemes have small performance
degradation caused by complicated coupling relationship between
achievable secrecy rate and the channel gains. To solve the issue,
we here introduce deep neural network (DNN) to decouple the
complicated relationship. The simulation results show the DNN
scheme can achieve better decoupling and thus perform almost
the same performance with conventional exhausted searching
scheme.
Index Terms—transmit antenna selection, untrusted relay net-
works, DNN
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, artificial intelligence (AI) has made great
success in many fields such as pattern recognitions and signal
processing, and the intelligence communication is considered
a sightful way for wireless communication after 5G [1].
Currently, the research of AI is advancing into physical
layer security in wireless communication so as to reduce the
complexity and solve other existing problems to improve the
system performance [2].
Especially, the ML technology has become one of most
popular AI technologies in physical layer security [3]. For
example, the ML schemes are conducted for the antenna selec-
tion in wiretap networks [4]. In [5], the author studied resource
allocation in multi-channel cognitive networks using DNN
method. DL algorithm was proposed in [6] to improve the
performance of the belief propagation algorithm for decoding.
In [7], an unsupervised deep learning was used in Multiple-
Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) encoder system.
In our previous work [8], we applied ML schemes,
namely, support vector machine(SVM), naive-bayes(NB), and
k-nearest neighbors(k-NN), to implement TAS for the op-
timization problem in (8). However, ML-based scheme has
a little system degradation due to nonlinear coupling. In
this paper, since the DNN can solve the various nonlinear
distortions, we believe that the DL application is a useful and
promising way to achieve decoupling in antenna selection. Our
main contributions are as follows:
• We focus on DL scheme to enhance physical layer
security in untrusted relay networks.
• Compared to our previous work in [8], we extend our
research by DNN to achieve decoupling and further get
better system performance.
II. SYSTEM AND SIGNAL MODEL
We consider half-duplex two-hop untrusted relay networks,
consisting of a source (S), a destination (D) and an untrusted
amplifying-and-forward (AF) relay (R) equipped with NS,
NR, ND antennas, respectively. For simplicity, we assume
NR = ND = 1 for our initial work. We note that only the
source S is employed to process the transmit antenna selection.
Further, all channels are subject to independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d) Rayleigh fading.
In this system, there is no direct link between S and D be-
cause of shadowing or long distance; Therefore the communi-
cation is implemented via R. We denote h = [h1, · · · , hNS] ∈
C1×NS as the channel vector from S to R. Further define
gR−D ∈ C1×1 and gD−R ∈ C1×1 as the channel gains
from R to D and from D to R. Here, since the channel
reciprocity is considered, we have gR−D = g
∗
D−R = g. Due
to the high cost of RF chain, only NT antennas among NS
of S are activated to perform transmission. Assume that the
available NS antennas are labeled as 1, 2, · · · , NS and the
selected NT antennas are with the indices s1, s2, · · · , sNT
where sj ∈ [1, NS] for j = 1, · · · , NT. Therefore, the
practical propagation channel from S to R can be denoted
as h˜ =
[
hs1 , · · · , hsNT
]
∈ C1×NT . In order to maximize the
received SNR for the relay R, the source S adopts matched
filter precoding. In this case, the precoding vector for S’s
transmission is pMF =
h˜
H
‖h˜‖2
, where ‖ · ‖2 represents the 2-
norm of a vector.
Owing to the relay is untrustworthy, we adopt the
destination-aided jamming (DAJ) technique [9] and divide the
transmission into two time-slots.
In the first time slot, S transmits its precoded signal, pMFxS
to R with xS being the confidential signal, and simultaneously
D emits cooperative jamming signal xJ to R in the same
frequency. The received signal at R, yR, is presented by [9]
yR =
√
PS
NT
h˜pMFxS +
√
PDgD−RxJ + nR
=
√
PS
NT
‖h˜‖2xS +
√
PDgxJ + nR, (1)
where xS and xJ are both with unit power; PS and PD
are the transmitted powers from S and D; nR denotes the
complex additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) received at
R, following CN (0, N0)-distribution. In this letter, all the
AWGNs received both at R in the first time slot and at D
in the second time slot are assumed with unit power spectral
density (PSD), i.e., N0 = 1. Hence, the signal-to-noise ratio
2(SNR) at different nodes can be adjusted by the transmitted
power. With the cooperative jamming signal as the second item
in (1), the eavesdropping capability of R is degraded.
From (1), the instantaneous received signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) at R can be denoted as
γR =
PS
NT
‖h˜‖22
(PD|g|2 + 1) . (2)
In the second time slot, the relay R re-transmits the received
signal to D after amplifying it with an amplification factor β.
Let PR be the transmitted power by R. Therefore, with yR in
(1), the amplification factor β can be denoted as
β2 =
PR
PS
NT
‖h˜‖22 + PD|g|2 + 1
. (3)
Then the received signal at D from R is given by
yD = βgR−D
√
PS
NT
‖h˜‖22xS + βgR−D
√
PDgD−RxJ
+ βgR−DnR + nD, (4)
where nD is the complex AWGN received at D, which is also
assumed to be CN (0, 1)-distributed.
Since the second item in (4) is transmitted by D itself, D
can perform self-interference cancellation with perfect channel
state information (CSI) available. Consequently, the instanta-
neous SINR at D can be presented as
γD =
PS
NT
β2‖h˜‖22|g|2
β2|g|2 + 1 . (5)
In physical-layer security based untrusted relay system, the
achievable secrecy rate can be defined as [10]
Rs = [log2(1 + γD)− log2(1 + γR)]+ , (6)
where [·]+ = max(·, 0). Note that, for simplification, we
neglect this operator for the following derivation but consider
it for simulation.
With (2) and (5), we can formulate the secrecy rate Rs in
(6) after some calculations as
Rs = log2
(
PS
NT
‖h˜‖22
PD|g|2 + 1
×
PS
NT
PR|g|2‖h˜‖22 + PR|g|2 + PSNT ‖h˜‖22 + PD|g|2 + 1
PR|g|2 + PSNT ‖h˜‖22 + PD|g|2 + 1
)
.
(7)
When we select only one antenna, namely hs, to imple-
ment the transmission. Therefore, ‖h˜‖22 in (7) can be further
replaced with |hs|2.
III. CONVENTIONAL AND MACHINE LEARNING-BASED
ANTENNA SELECTION SCHEME
In conventional antenna selection, the source S can be aware
of all CSIs, such as h and g. Then, S traverses all the pos-
sible antenna combinations, and computes the corresponding
secrecy rate. The maximum secrecy rate and the corresponding
antenna selection scheme are the solutions for TAS problem.
The optimization problem can be formulated as
n∗ = argmax
n∈L
Rs, (8)
where L denote the index set for all possible combinations for
selected antennas, with size CNTNS =
NS!
NT!(NS−NT)!
.
As can be seen from the analysis of (7), there exists quite
an involved coupling relationship for Rs with h˜ and g. It
is hard for ML scheme to achieve decoupling since the ML
schemes usually deal with some linear problems; in this case
more misclassification is led to and degradation of system
performance is emerged [8]. Considering the superiority of
DNN to solve nonlinearity, we will introduce DNN method to
decouple the above complicated relationship and achieve the
optimal antenna selection in untrusted relay networks.
IV. DNN-BASED ANTENNA SELECTION SCHEME
The DNN structure we utilize here has 3 layers consisting
of an input layer, hidden layers and an output layer and every
layer has their own neurons [11]. Three procedures for DNN-
based TAS scheme are as follows.
A. Data sets generation
First, we generate a training data set and a testing data set,
each of which containingM diverse real 1×(NS+1) channel
state information(CSI) data samples, e.g. d1,d2, · · · ,dM .
To be specific, the m-th training or testing data samples
can be denoted as dm =
[|hm1 |, |hm2 |, · · · , |hmNS |, |gm|] for
m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}.
Then, we generate normalized feature vector tm by nor-
malizing dm. The i-th element of tm, tmi , can be generated
as
tmi =
dmi − E[dm]
max(dm)−min(dm) , (9)
where dmi is the i-th element of d
m; E denotes the expected
value operation.
Furthermore, we calculate secrecy rate of each antenna
combination in L as the KPI, and we choose the target
antennas that achieves the maximum secrecy rate.
B. Construct DNN model
We construct DNN model on Tensorflow platform.
In input layer of the training DNN model, each item of the
normalized training feature vector obtained in (9) corresponds
to each neuron as the input.
In output layer of the DNN model, selected labels corre-
sponds to each neuron as the output. Meanwhile, The one-
hot encoding is choosed for the labels. It means that when
there is L combinations, it needs L bits to encode labels.
The processed label has only one bit equaling to 1 and other
bits equaling to 0. For example, when selecting 1 antenna
from 6 antennas, the selected label 6 can be coded as 000001
and 4 can be coded as 000100; when selecting 2 antenna
from 6 antennas, the selected label 10 can be coded as
000000000100000 and 14 can be coded as 000000000000010.
3Then, we set a series of parameters, such as learning rate,
model training times, batch size and the neurons of input layer,
hidden layer and output layer and so on. We adopt rectified
linear units (ReLU) function as the hidden layer function; In
addition, we apply RMSProp optimizer as the model optimizer
method. For last layer’s neuron x to next layer’s neuron y, it
can be denoted as y = WTx + b, The weight matrix of last
layer’s output to the next layer’s neuron is W; b is the bias
parameter. In addition, the RMSProp optimizer as the model
optimizer method is applied.
C. Start model training and predication
We train DNN model to extract its features and set up
internal parameters. After the model is established, we perform
label prediction of normalized testing feature vector by DNN.
When DNN model carries out label predicting, the normal-
ized testing feature vector obtained in (9) is regarded as input,
and the probability of each antenna (i.e., P1,P2, · · · ,PNs)
corresponding each output layer’s neuron is regarded as output.
For example, when it is single antenna selection, the label
which make the highest probability will be selected; when it
is two antenna selection, the label combination which make
the highest probability will be selected.
The reason for setting up probability of each antenna is that
we use logistic function equation f(c) = 11+e−c as the output
layer function, where c correspond the input elements of the
output layer.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we present some simulation results to verify
the efficiency of the DNN-based schemes. The size of both
training data and testing data are set 200000×7. The source
S is configured with NS = 6 antennas, and NT = 1 or 2
antennas will be selected out. For simplicity, we set PS =
PD = PR.
The experiment is carried out in Tensorflow platform which
exploiting GPU processing power, thus solving the large
amount of data more efficiently. By looking for the maximum
classification accuracy as possible, those parameters are ad-
justed and confirmed. The amount of the input layer, hidden
layer, output layer of DNN architecture is set to 1, 1, 1,
repectively; the batch size is 128; the learning rate is 0.01;
when selecting 1 antenna from 6 antennas, the neurons of
input layer, hidden layer and output layer are set 7, 1500, 6
or set 7, 1500, 15 when selecting 2 antenna from 6 antennas.
A. System Performance
The system performance simulation is conducted in terms
of secrecy rate defined in (6) and secrecy outage probability
(SOP). The SOP can be defined as
Pout(Rt) = P(Rs < Rt), (10)
where P(·) is the probability, Rt is the target SOP and Rt =
2bps/Hz.
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Fig. 1: Secrecy rate of single antenna selection for DNN and
other schemes
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schemes
From [8], the k-NN scheme of ML schemes has the highest
performance. Therefore, the single antenna for TAS of the k-
NN, DNN, and conventional schemes are compared in terms
of secrecy rate and SOP as shown in Figs. 1 and 2. In addition,
two antennas for TAS of the k-NN, DNN, and conventional
schemes are compared in Figs. 3 and 4. And it can indicate that
DNN-based TAS scheme outperforms than other ML schemes.
Furthermore, the DNN-based scheme achieves almost the
same performance with conventional scheme, thus indicating
that our proposed DNN-based scheme can achieve decoupling.
It is because that each layer of DNN architecture plays a
processing unit to solve the the non-linear relationship among
the features while the ML schemes merely solve linear rela-
tionship. In addition, the DNN shows outstanding modeling
capability compared to existing ML methods. [11]
B. Computational Complexity
As stated in Section III, |L| presents the cardinality of se-
lected antenna combinations, and |L| = CNTNS = NS!NT!(NS−NT)! .
Let N = NS + 1. The selection complexity for SVM, NB, k-
NN, DNN and conventional schemes are O(N2), O(|L|N +
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|L| log |L|), O(N), O(1) and O(N+ |L| log |L|), respectively
[4], [12]. We can clearly see that the complexity of DNN
and ML schemes are rather lower than that of conventional
schemes. It is because that the conventional TAS scheme
requires to process the global search and comparison for every
antenna combination. However, the complexity of ML-based
and DL-based schemes rely on the prediction complexity
rather than the training complexity because the model training
can be performed offline. Besides, the well-trained DNN
architecture only make finite computing processing.
C. Classification Performance
Actually, TAS is equivalent to a classification system with
ML and DL algorithms. In this subsection, we present the
misclassification rate for single antenna selection by using the
web representation, SNR = 15 dB. The value of each point in
polygon denotes the misclassification rate of the corresponding
channel index by l → l, where l, l ∈ L and l 6= l. From
Fig. 5, it can be seen that the DL misclassification rate is
greatly lower than the rate for DL, which shows the high
classification accuracy and great decoupling capability of the
DNN by another aspect.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we applied DNN-based antenna selection
scheme to achieve decoupling not being solved by other ML-
based schemes (i.e., SVM, NB and k-NN) as well as to reduce
the complexity in untrusted relay networks. The simulation re-
sults show that our proposed DNN-based scheme can achieve
almost the same secrecy rate and SOP as conventional scheme
with transmitted power constraint at the relay.
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